Suchergebnisse

The paper discusses implications for practice and theory of the recently completed Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 2004-06 based on case studies in Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda and Vietnam. The paper first looks at the extent to which general budget support, on the evidence of the evaluation, stands up to common criticisms of the effects of aid on government in low income, aid dependent countries. Allowing for much caution owing to the short period of partnership general budget support (PGBS) programmes in some countries, the finding is that there are small but positive impacts (notably reducing unnecessary transaction costs and increasing discretion of government—thereby raising allocative and operational efficiency). Net benefits are generally greater where PGBS programmes are longer established. Areas of uncertainty regarding future effects are its uncertain overall contribution to the private sector and growth, its vulnerability to changes in political relations, and the limitations to raising 'pro-poor expenditure'—the main tool it has used to leverage increases in health and education spending; long term improvements in access and quality of public services will rely on better planning, budgeting and services management. The paper then considers how the evaluation results affect the way that PGBS is understood in theory: (i) it first suggests that PGBS raises entitlements (by increasing confidence that there will be continuing flows of budget support) which encourages policy development and stable donor-government collaboration structures, to which other shorter term aid arrangements gravitate, thereby reducing previous coordination failures; (ii) relations in organizations are then identified on a spectrum from market through club to hierarchy. Applied to PGBS coordination structures this suggests they are aspirant clubs, with hierarchical features strongest where PGBS is least established, and club features stronger where government is more capable and assertive; (iii) entitlements are accompanied by rules which attempt to raise positive incentive effects of the entitlement and reduce its negative incentive effects. In PGBS arrangements rules vary from hierarchical (e.g., prior actions), through club oriented (e.g., assessment on medium term trends) to market oriented (performance payments related to achievement on specific indicators). The analysis of rules in relation to PGBS incentives and operating environments (on a spectrum from rigid/uncertain to flexible/predictable) concludes that fine tuning rules in rigid/uncertain operating environments is counterproductive. Integrating PGBS performance assessment frameworks (PAFs) into government plans and monitoring systems will serve to unify rules. – aid ; budget support ; entitlement ; rules ; club ; market ; coordination

AbstractThree main observations are made in this article. First, aid administration costs are not regarded as a major problem by government aid recipients in Cambodia. Second, resource availability appears to be the underlying, pressing issue which may substantially determine skill retention, capacity and hence ownership in a government department. This is suggested by the greater ownership exhibited by well‐resourced government departments. Third, reform of aid management practices which focuses on improving continuity of resourcing (e.g. longer term commitments), and joint working with government are likely to be more important than attempts to reduce administrative costs of aid. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

AbstractAttacking Poverty has attracted more than the usual interest in World Development Reports mainly because it reflects the dilemma in future strategy for the World Bank. Its basis in a widely welcomed consultation with the poor, its transparent process and new conceptual framework contrast with limited development of the new themes — equality, security, empowerment of the poor — and of issues to do with aid: resources and rights. Contributors to this special issue discuss the dilemma reflected in Attacking Poverty from a number of angles: critical self‐awareness by World Bank, promoting equality, shifting from the Washington Consensus, limits to the Bank's role, and enabling collective action by the poor. Other contributions discuss how the analysis in Attacking Poverty should be strengthened: inclusion of urban poverty and urbanisation's role in political development, promoting informal means of reducing vulnerability, and investigation of the long term consequences of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Priorities for the next poverty‐focused World Development Report (2010?) should include a more disaggregated and complete view of who is poor, why and where, and analysis of progress in political development. The World Bank may be best able to contribute to political development by extending to the subnational and public services level its main achievement of recent decades: the gathering, analysis and dissemination of comparative development data, to help move the focus of politics towards improving services and living standards. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

AbstractThis article sets out an approach to assessing project performance, using 'potential impact' of the project. Its purpose is to assist project design and evaluation. In project design, potential impacts of alternative activities on the project objective are compared, in order to select activities with the greatest impact. In project evaluation, potential and actual impacts of a project are compared. Additional benefits of the approach are that it indicates 'value for money' of development assistance invested in projects, and easier tracing of reasons for underachievement in projects to weaknesses in their design or management. Limitations are that it relies on informed judgement of the planners or evaluators and the categories for rating performance may unavoidably be broad. It complements the logical framework approach by providing a practical design and evaluation tool. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Local government entrepreneurship in China in the reform era is argued to have been, on balance, instrumental to growth and market‐oriented reform.1 Economic factors are emphasized in explaining both its rise and anticipated decline. Undeveloped markets and established local state trading networks favored agencies of the local state in exploiting business opportunities arising from deregulation. However, market development and increasing autonomy of firms are now reducing the advantage of local government business agencies, and they face a diminished and changed role.

Examines how local government entrepreneurship is leading to market-oriented reform, since 1978.